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Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes and His Contributions 
to the Judiciary of New Jersey∗ 
John B. Wefing∗∗ 
Since the adoption of the New Jersey Constitution in 1947 with 
its dramatically improved judicial article, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has gained a reputation as a progressive, activist, liberal court.  
Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme Court said: 
“The New Jersey Supreme Court has ranked as one of the country’s 
outstanding appellate courts since its creation in 1947.”1  Many of the 
court’s decisions have been cited and followed by other jurisdictions.  
This has been partly the result of the extraordinary leadership of the 
five Chief Justices who have led that court.  Those Justices, Vander-
bilt,2 Weintraub,3 Hughes,4 Wilentz,5 and Poritz,6 have all burnished 
 
 ∗ This Article is a modified version of a chapter which will appear in a biography 
of Richard J. Hughes. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., St. Peter’s College; 
J.D., Catholic University; LL.M., New York University.  The Author wishes to thank 
Eileen Denner, research librarian at Seton Hall University School of Law, for her ex-
cellent research support.  The Author also acknowledges the diligent efforts of his 
research assistants Peter Jabbour and Michael Laudino. 
 1 William J. Brennan, Jr., Introduction, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Mountain, 10 
SETON HALL L. REV. xxiv, xxiv (1979).  See also BARBARA G. SALMORE & STEPHEN A. 
SALMORE, NEW JERSEY POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: SUBURBAN POLITICS COMES OF AGE 
191 (1st ed.1993). 
 2 Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt was the first Chief Justice under the new 
constitution.  He had previously served as Dean of New York University School of 
Law, President of the American Bar Association, and Republican leader of Essex 
County.  He was seriously considered for Chief Justice of the United States at the 
time when Earl Warren was selected. 
 3 Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub was a brilliant legal scholar distinguishing him-
self at Cornell Law School where he served as editor of the Cornell Law Quarterly and 
graduated first in the class.  He had an impressive legal career before his appoint-
ment to the Court. 
 4 This Article will focus on the achievements of Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes. 
 5 Chief Justice Robert Wilentz was the son of David Wilentz, who had served as 
attorney general of the state, tried the Lindberg kidnapping case, and was the long-
time Democratic leader of Middlesex County.  The Chief graduated from Columbia 
Law School and had served in the New Jersey Legislature before his appointment.  
He led the court through the eighties and part of the nineties. 
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that reputation.7  This Article will focus on the achievements of Chief 
Justice Richard J. Hughes as he led the court for six years from 1973 
to 1979.  It will particularly focus on two issues where his decisions 
continue to have relevance today.  They are the school funding cases8 
and the right to die case, In re Quinlan.9 
Hughes was the first and only person in New Jersey history to 
serve as both Governor and Chief Justice.  He had served as Governor 
from 1962 to 1970.  However, prior to his election as Governor he 
had served ten years as a judge.  He had originally been appointed by 
Governor Alfred E. Driscoll as a judge of the Court of Common Pleas 
just before the 1947 Constitution came into effect.  That appoint-
ment became an appointment to the County Court when the Consti-
tution became effective.  Later Governor Driscoll appointed him to 
the Superior Court.  He served in many different capacities including 
Assignment Judge of Union County and as an Appellate Division 
judge.  These designations demonstrated his excellence as a judge.  
The Chief Justice, who designates Assignment Judges and Appellate 
Division Judges, takes great care in making those appointments.  He 
was also considered for the Supreme Court before leaving the bench 
for private practice in order to support his large family.  Four years 
after leaving the bench for private practice he was elected Governor 
of the State of New Jersey.10 
Hughes as Governor had been a progressive, activist Democratic 
leader of the State.  He would carry over those characteristics into his 
role as Chief Justice.11 
 
 6 Chief Justice Deborah T. Poritz had served as Counsel to the Governor and At-
torney General before appointment to the court.  She was the first woman Chief Jus-
tice in New Jersey. 
 7 Pierre Garvin was appointed as Chief Justice but died shortly after his ap-
pointment. 
 8 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Robinson v. 
Cahill (Robinson II), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 
6 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Robinson v. 
Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975), Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 
V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976), Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 
358 A.2d 457 (1976), Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VII), 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 
(1976). 
 9 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
 10 THE GOVERNORS OF NEW JERSEY, 1664–1974: BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS 223–28 (Paul 
A. Stellhorn & Michael J. Birkner eds., 1982). 
 11 Alvin S. Felzenberg, The Impact of Gubernatorial Style on Policy Outcomes: 
An in Depth Study of Three New Jersey Governors 182 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author). 
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His appointment as Chief Justice by Governor William T. Cahill, 
his gubernatorial successor and a Republican, was a shock to the 
state.12  But, in spite of the fact that Cahill was a Republican and 
Hughes a Democrat, they were good friends.13  They had met when 
Hughes was a judge and Cahill was a trial lawyer trying a major case 
before him.  Hughes described him as “a great trial lawyer.”14  They 
were both Irish Catholics.  They continued their relationship while 
Hughes was Governor and Cahill was a Congressman. 
In August of 1973, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub stepped down 
as Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court after sixteen years.  
Governor Cahill appointed his Chief Counsel, Pierre Garvin, to suc-
ceed Weintraub.  Garvin died tragically in October of 1973.  At that 
point, Cahill was a lame duck.  A Democrat, Brendan Byrne, was 
poised to succeed him.  Cahill knew that the Democrats would never 
let him appoint a Republican.  Nevertheless, he still wanted to make 
the appointment.  He realized that he could appoint the popular 
former Democratic Governor and he did so.  Governor Byrne, the in-
coming Democratic governor who had been appointed to the Board 
of Public Utilities by Hughes, acquiesced.15 
In many ways Hughes was an ideal candidate to serve as Chief 
Justice.  He had many years of judicial and other legal experience to 
help him in his role as a member of that judicial body.16  However, 
the role of Chief Justice also includes a large administrative compo-
nent.  The Chief Justice oversees a large and complex court system.  
Unlike some other court systems, the Chief Justice in New Jersey ac-
 
 12 Ben Van Vliet, County Officials, Lawyers Endorse Hughes, DAILY REG. (Red Bank & 
Middletown, New Jersey), Nov. 9, 1973, at 2. 
 13 Hughes had a great ability, despite his strong commitment to the Democratic 
party, to relate to members of the Republican party.  He was able to depersonalize 
political differences. 
 14 Interview by George Amick & John Kolesar with Richard J. Hughes, Governor 
of New Jersey (1982) (transcript on file with author). 
 15 Interview with Richard Leone, former member of Governor Hughes’ staff and 
later Treasurer of the State of New Jersey under Governor Brendan Byrne, in New 
York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 2004). 
 16 Judge Milmed, in discussing Hughes’ influence on the development of admin-
istrative law in New Jersey, said: “Blessed by unique opportunity and ability to lead 
both the executive and judicial branches of our state government, he has built into 
that process lasting benefits of fair play and understanding for all the people of New 
Jersey of this and future generations.”  Leon S. Milmed, Chief Justice Richard J. 
Hughes—Architect of a Responsive Administrative Process, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 78, 85 
(1979). 
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tively manages the system.17  For example, the Chief determines who 
will serve as assignment judges, who will serve as appellate division 
judges, and generally the division in which each of the Superior 
Court judges will serve.  The Chief Justice is also responsible for run-
ning the support staff for the entire judiciary.  Therefore, his experi-
ence in administering the state as Governor served as a great asset.  
Justice Morris Pashman, who served on the court with Chief Justice 
Hughes, said: 
 Chief Justice Hughes was not only a great jurist, he was also an 
excellent administrator.  Too often laymen are apt to forget that 
the major duty of a Chief Justice is that of supervising the conduct 
of all of New Jersey’s courts.  There can be no doubt that the 
many reforms quietly accomplished by Hughes as administrator 
will have a lasting impact upon our judicial system.18 
Hughes’ tenure as Chief Justice was a complete change.  For six-
teen years Justice Weintraub, a brilliant legal scholar, ran the court 
and seemed to dominate it.  Weintraub had a distinguished legal 
background.  After graduating from Cornell University Phi Beta 
Kappa, he attended Cornell Law School.  There, he won special hon-
ors and was Editor-in-Chief of the Cornell Law Quarterly.  He served 
as counsel to the Governor and as a member of the Waterfront 
Commission.  But Hughes was more of a consensus-builder.  While 
Chief Justice Weintraub could be aloof and distant, Hughes was out-
going and direct.  He immediately improved the relationship be-
tween the court and the lawyers in the state.  He traveled across the 
state meeting with judges and lawyers and worked diligently to main-
tain a good working relationship between the bench and the bar.  He 
also had a great relationship with his own colleagues on the court.  
Justice Pashman said: 
Richard Hughes is a man of great humility, strong character, wide 
knowledge, and utmost integrity.  He has a quality that spells 
quiet decency, warm friendliness, and simple dignity.  These vir-
tues impelled him both to accord each of us on the Court an op-
portunity for full self-expression and to encourage our judiciary to 
tolerate dissent.  He realized that such a climate was necessary in 
order that human rights and civil liberties be safeguarded.19 
 
 17 The New Jersey Constitution, Article VI, section vii provides: “The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of all the courts in the State.”  
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § vii. 
 18 Morris Pashman, A Tribute to Richard J. Hughes: Judge and Administrator, 10 
SETON HALL L. REV. 86, 89 (1979). 
 19 Id. at 90. 
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THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 
In an article written shortly after Hughes left the Supreme 
Court, he set forth some of his judicial philosophy.20  He praised the 
authors of the 1947 Constitution which had greatly improved the le-
gal system in New Jersey and gave the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
great powers.  He emphasized the importance of judicial independ-
ence and praised the system of appointment as opposed to an elec-
tion system for choosing judges.  “It is therefore most fortunate that 
in New Jersey, the constitutional method of appointment of judges, 
the traditional bipartisan division of court membership,21 and abso-
lute freedom from politics assure an independent judiciary, having 
the respect and support of the people.” 22  He praised the prior chief 
justices and the court’s “willingness to cope with new problems and 
devise new solutions in the name of justice, as the common law un-
folds and the Constitution adapts its magnificent basic philosophy to 
meet new societal problems, as a living organism rather than a dead 
letter.”23  He was happy that the court did not feel compelled in all 
cases to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, the doctrine that requires 
courts to follow past precedent.  “[W]e have discarded the chains of 
stare decisis, so far as that ancient principle would bind us to the injus-
tices of the past.”24  As one of his clerks would say, “He had an instinct 
for justice, and would not be deterred from reaching the right result 
even if it meant making new law.”25  He also approved of the practice 
of disagreeing with United States Supreme Court opinions.  He be-
lieved the New Jersey Constitution could and should be used to reach 
results the United States Supreme Court would not grant under the 
United States Constitution.  For example, during his tenure on the 
court, the court applied that doctrine for the first time in a search 
and seizure case recognizing the right of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court to expand the rights in a consent search case beyond those 
given by the United States Supreme Court by relying on the provision 
 
 20 Richard J. Hughes, Reflections: “A Growing Court,” 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 379 
(1981). 
 21 There is an unwritten but scrupulously followed tradition in New Jersey that 
the Supreme Court and in fact all the judiciary will be divided evenly between De-
mocrats and Republicans.  Therefore, the Supreme Court will generally have at least 
three members from each party with the party in control having the fourth member. 
 22 Hughes, supra note 20, at 382 (footnote omitted). 
 23 Id. at 384. 
 24 Id. at 386. 
 25 Letter from Gary A. Ehrlich, Assistant Attorney General, State of New Jersey; 
former law clerk to Chief Justice Hughes, to author (Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with au-
thor). 
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of the New Jersey Constitution protecting against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  The United States Supreme Court had held in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte26 that the test for determining consent to a 
search would be based on the “totality of the circumstances” ap-
proach.  That decision had been criticized as not being adequately 
protective of the search and seizure rights of the citizens.27  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court decided that although it could not disagree 
with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, it could grant greater rights under the search and sei-
zure provision of the New Jersey Constitution.28  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court then adopted a waiver approach as its rule in State v. 
Johnson.29  In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was striking out 
in a different direction.  Previously, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
had been conservative in the area of search and seizure.  But the 
Johnson case set a trend that continued into the future, with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court setting its own path in determining the mean-
ing of the search and seizure law in New Jersey.30 
Chief Justice Hughes also praised decisions of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopting a “fairness and rightness” doctrine.  “Even 
where no constitutional right is involved, this ‘fairness and rightness’ 
concept is sometimes invoked to prevent arbitrary abuse of power 
such as in a parole board’s refusal to state reasons for its denial of pa-
role to a prisoner entitled to be considered for parole.”31  However, 
he also recognized that the court was not a “super-legislature” and 
that, when appropriate, the court should defer to the legislature.32  
Justice Sidney Schreiber, a colleague of Chief Justice Hughes, de-
scribed him as follows: “The opinions of Chief Justice Hughes . . . re-
flect what might best be termed a result-oriented approach to judicial 
decision-making.  The Chief Justice serves as a ringing conscience for 
 
 26 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 27 John B. Wefing & John G. Miles, Jr., Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: 
Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 251–52 (1974). 
 28 N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7. 
 29 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). 
 30 The New Jersey Supreme Court has decided a large number of cases in which 
it differed with the more conservative views of the United States Supreme Court.  See, 
e.g., State v. Pierce, 139 N.J. 184, 642 A.2d 947 (1994); State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 
642 A.2d 401 (1994); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990); State v. 
Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1986). 
 31 Hughes, supra note 20, at 390.  The case referred to by Chief Justice Hughes 
was Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975). 
 32 Hughes, supra note 20, at 390–91. 
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fairness and justice, for whom policies are marshalled to support a re-
sult compelled by the facts of a particular case.”33 
THE COURT AS SOCIAL ACTIVIST 
The New Jersey Supreme Court before, during, and after the 
Hughes years, took on many major societal issues, playing a leader-
ship role in the nation in dealing with the social problems.  Two areas 
which stand out are the inadequacy of schools in poorer urban areas 
and providing low- and moderate-income housing.  While some ar-
gued that these cases might have gone too far in taking on the role of 
the legislature, the court found it imperative to deal with these press-
ing concerns.  The two cases, or more properly series of cases, were 
Robinson v. Cahill34 and Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township 
of Mount Laurel.35  Robinson declared that the system of school funding 
in New Jersey, which relied primarily on property taxes, was unconsti-
tutional.36  Mt. Laurel determined that various municipal ordinances 
which restricted access for low and moderate income housing were 
unconstitutional.37  These two series of cases have been among the 
most praised and criticized in the nation’s history. 
HUGHES AND SCHOOL FUNDING 
Hughes’ role in school funding was particularly important.  
While Governor, Hughes continually sought to increase spending for 
education.  He was successful in finding money to support the county 
and state colleges.38  However, because of the emphasis on home rule 
and the lack of a large state budget, he was never able to dramatically 
increase state spending for the public schools.  By 1973, the State was 
supplying twenty-eight percent of the funds for the public schools 
 
 33 Sidney M. Schreiber, Statutory Interpretation: Some Comments on Two Judicial View-
points, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 94, 101 (1979). 
 34 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Robinson v. 
Cahill (Robinson II), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 
6 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Robinson v. 
Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 
V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 
358 A.2d 457 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VII), 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 
(1976). 
 35 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1976). 
 36 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 520–21, 303 A.2d at 297–98. 
 37 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. at 187–91, 336 A.2d at 732–34. 
 38 Hughes was able to push through a number of bond issues which were used in 
part to increase the opportunities for higher education in the state.  The whole sys-
tem of county colleges was also developed while he was governor. 
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while the local municipalities were providing most of the remainder.39  
(The federal government provided about five percent.)  Governor 
Hughes would have preferred to spend far more on those schools.  
He had worked to get an income tax enacted in the state and would 
have used the proceeds from the income tax for that purpose.40  
However, he was not successful in his attempt to establish an income 
tax. 
As a result of the emphasis on local funding,41 there were signifi-
cant differences between what the poor urban districts spent on 
schools and what the wealthy suburban districts spent.42  This imbal-
ance had been created by the loss of both business and residents in 
the cities, which lowered the tax base.  Additionally the cities had so-
cial problems which also drained their coffers.  A number of the cities 
had also suffered from riots during the 1960s which added to the 
flight of the middle class and further injured the infrastructure within 
those cities. 
Shortly before Hughes became Chief Justice, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court faced a constitutional challenge to the existing funding 
system in the state.43  The plaintiffs in that case, Robinson v. Cahill,44 
were students in poor urban districts whose schools were allegedly 
failing to provide an adequate education.  The case was argued on a 
number of theories.  The first theory was Equal Protection under the 
United States Constitution.45  However, as the Robinson case was pro-
gressing through the New Jersey court system, another case from 
Texas was before the United States Supreme Court.46  In that case, a 
similar situation in Texas was challenged as violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
 
 39 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276. 
 40 Richard Leone, Politics of Gubernatorial Leadership, Tax and Education Re-
form in New Jersey (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) 
(on file with author). 
 41 “Localism has a long history in the United States, and particularly in New Jer-
sey. . . . Citizens who prized the independence of their local governments not surpris-
ingly had little interest in sharing power with more distant levels of political author-
ity, be it county, region or state.”  LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE 
POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 228–29 (2003). 
 42 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 480–82, 303 A.2d at 276–77. 
 43 Shortly before the Robinson decision, the California Supreme Court in Serrano 
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) had declared the system in California to be unconsti-
tutional.  See generally John Dayton, J.D., Ed.D., Serrano and its Progeny: An Analysis of 
30 Years of School Funding Litigation, 157 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 447 (2001). 
 44 Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273. 
 45 Id. at 482–501, 303 A.2d at 277–87. 
 46 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Constitution.  The United States Supreme Court held that the Texas 
system was constitutional.47  The New Jersey courts were therefore un-
able to find the system in New Jersey violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court had previously found 
that implied in Article I, § 1 of the New Jersey Constitution was the 
right to equal protection.48  Therefore, the court could have decided 
that the system of educational funding was unconstitutional under 
the New Jersey equal protection clause.49  Nevertheless, the court, in 
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Weintraub, did not base the de-
cision on equal protection.  Rather, it turned to a specific provision 
of the New Jersey Constitution which provided that the State had the 
obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education for all stu-
dents aged five to eighteen.50  The court found that the system of 
school funding, which relied so heavily on property taxes, was uncon-
stitutional.51  At that time only twenty-eight percent of the funding for 
the schools came from the State, five percent from the federal gov-
ernment and the remaining sixty-seven percent from local property 
taxes.52  The court recognized that the poorer urban centers were 
burdened by large expenditures to pay for the costs of other ser-
vices.53  There were so many expenses on the cities, and the cities had 
lost so much of their tax base that they were simply unable to spend 
sufficient funds on their school systems.  The court did not mandate 
any specific remedy.  Rather, the court ordered the Legislature to 
come up with a constitutional solution to the constitutional prob-
lem.54  Professors Dayton and Dupre recognized that the decision by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court opened a new avenue of attack upon 
school funding systems across the country.55  The first case striking 
 
 47 Id. at 4–6, 62. 
 48 That provision provides: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and 
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of 
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”  N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 1. 
 49 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282. 
 50 In 1875 the New Jersey Constitution was amended by adding, “The Legislature 
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of 
free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the 
ages of five and eighteen years.”  N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. 
 51 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 520–21, 303 A.2d at 297–98. 
 52 Id. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276. 
 53 Id. at 511, 303 A.2d at 293. 
 54 See id. at 520–21, 303 A.2d at 298. 
 55 John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2365 (2004). 
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down a state educational funding system came from California56 and 
like other early cases, the California court relied upon equal protec-
tion.  New Jersey was the first state to rely upon a specific provision of 
its own constitution.  “The Robinson decision established a new model 
for plaintiffs throughout the country as they pressed their state courts 
to overturn entrenched school funding systems.”57 
When Chief Justice Hughes was appointed, the Legislature had 
not yet devised a solution.  Throughout Hughes’ term as Chief Jus-
tice, this issue would repeatedly come before the court.58  The court 
grappled with the difficult legal issues involved in trying to force the 
executive and legislative branches of the government to provide the 
necessary funds to improve the schools in the urban areas.  At first, 
Hughes moved slowly, trying to reconcile the needs of the schools 
with separation of powers.  Clearly, the Legislature was the appropri-
ate body to determine how to fund this mandated increase in support 
for the public schools.  However, the legislators, fearing a backlash if 
they raised taxes, hesitated to act.  In Robinson II,59 the court allowed 
the Legislature time to come up with its own plan.  In Robinson III,60 it 
again extended the deadline.  However, Chief Justice Hughes, writing 
for the court in 1975 in Robinson IV,61 began to insist upon action.  He 
again gave deference to the Legislature, writing, “the Court’s func-
tion is to appraise compliance with the Constitution, not to legislate 
an educational system,”62 but restated that the court would step in to 
act if the Legislature defaulted on its obligation.  He then set forth a 
provisional remedy for the 1976–77 school-year in the event that the 
Legislature failed to act, which was to reconfigure school aid to better 
help the poor urban and rural districts.63 
In response to this decision, the Legislature passed the Public 
School Education Act of 197564 shortly before the court-ordered 
deadline.  This legislation was the product of much debate.  Gover-
nor Byrne supported an income tax solution to the funding problem, 
 
 56 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
 57 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 55, at 2365. 
 58 See supra note 34. 
 59 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson II), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied sub 
nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). 
 60 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), cert. denied sub 
nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). 
 61 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).  Justices 
Mountain and Clifford voted against the order. 
 62 Id. at 145, 351 A.2d at 719. 
 63 Id. at 146–52, 351 A.2d at 720–23. 
 64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-3 to -51 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005). 
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but faced significant anti-tax sentiment both in the Legislature and 
the polity at large.65  So, at the time of the passage of the Education 
Act, there was still no means available to fully fund the proposal. 
In Robinson V,66 the court upheld the facial validity of the Act.  
That decision, an unsigned per curiam opinion for the court, empha-
sized the steps which the Legislature had taken to quantify what con-
stituted a “thorough and efficient education.”67  It had also taken 
steps to increase the aid to the poorer districts that were suffering 
from municipal overburden.  Thus, the court concluded that—
assuming the Act was fully funded—it was constitutional.  However, 
the court also issued a threat that if the Legislature did not act by 
April 6, 1976, to enact legislation to fully fund the Act, it would take 
matters into its own hands.68 
Chief Justice Hughes wrote a concurring opinion.69  Two other 
members of the court dissented, believing that the new Act could not 
overcome the constitutional problems.70  Hughes noted the concerns 
that both Judge Milton B. Conford71 and Justice Pashman raised in 
their separate opinions and indicated sympathy with their difficul-
ties.72  He emphasized his concerns about the “workability” of the new 
system designed by the Legislature.73  Chief Justice Hughes felt that 
the Commissioner did not have sufficient powers to ensure a state-
wide “thorough and efficient system.”74  He felt that the problems of 
municipal overburden were so great that no Commissioner of Educa-
tion could ensure the success of the schools in the poorer districts.75  
But ultimately, in deference to support for separation of powers, the 
Chief Justice decided to concur in upholding the constitutionality of 
the Act.76  However, he noted: 
[I]f perchance in the reasonably near future there should be  
no effective step toward equalization, and it were to be established 
 
 65 Felzenberg, supra note 11, at 432–33. 
 66 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). 
 67 Id. at 455, 355 A.2d at 131–32. 
 68 Id. at 468, 355 A.2d at 139. 
 69 Id. at 468–76, 355 A.2d at 139–143 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). 
 70 Id. at 476–512, 355 A.2d at 143–62 (Conford, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 512–62, 355 A.2d at 163–89 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 71 Judge Conford, Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division, was sitting tempo-
rarily assigned.  Id. at 476, 355 A.2d at 143 (Conford, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 72 See Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 469, 355 A.2d at 139–40 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). 
 73 Id. at 470, 355 A.2d at 140. 
 74 Id. at 469, 355 A.2d at 140. 
 75 See id. 
 76 Id. at 475, 355 A.2d at 143. 
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by proofs that such failure caused to continue to fester the invidi-
ous discordancies of tax resources destructive of the possibility of 
meeting the constitutional goal, I would feel constrained to  
then determine the unconstitutionality in application of the 1975 
Act . . . .77 
His concerns, joined with the concerns of Justice Pashman and 
Judge Conford, foreshadowed the events of the future.  Years after 
Chief Justice Hughes left the court, another Chief Justice writing for 
the court declared the 1975 Act to be unconstitutional in its applica-
tion.78 
Despite the clear threat issued in the opinion, the Legislature 
still failed to fund the Act, as fear of the anti-tax backlash was strong.79  
Most of the legislators represented suburban districts where the peo-
ple were content with the quality of their schools.  In many cases, the 
suburbanites, relying on the doctrine of home rule, felt that the peo-
ple in cities should support their schools, as they supported theirs.  
Even the Democrats, who usually supported the poorer communities, 
were divided.  “A huge Democratic majority was split between urban 
legislators seeking property tax relief and more state aid and subur-
ban lawmakers whose constituents did not want to divert local funds 
to urban schools.”80  Unfortunately, this approach by the suburban 
legislators did not take into consideration the serious problems of 
municipal overburden—the cities had so many other burdens that 
they could not continue to increase taxes in order to adequately fund 
their schools. 
When the Legislature failed to fund the new Act, the court in 
Robinson v. Cahill VI81 ordered that no state education funds could be 
dispersed to any school district after July 1, 1976.82  Since every school 
district was at least partially funded by the State, this meant that the 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).  Chief Justice Wilentz 
wrote the opinion. 
 79 Leone, supra note 40, at 82. 
 80 SALMORE & SALMORE, supra note 1, at 196. 
 81 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).  Justice 
Mountain wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should not 
interfere with what he sees as essentially a legislative function.  “Thus the Court is in-
directly commanding that a tax be imposed.  But the taxing power is legislative and 
cannot be exercised by the judiciary.”  Id. at 165, 358 A.2d at 462 (Mountain, J., dis-
senting).  Justice Pashman also dissented but suggested a very different result giving 
the Commissioner of Education the power to allocate all the money raised by all the 
districts in the state as the Commissioner sees fit.  Id. at 168–70, 358 A.2d at 462–65 
(Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 82 Id. at 160, 358 A.2d at 459 (majority opinion). 
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schools could not open.  This decision threw the state into chaos.  
“Although less draconian than shutting the schools down in Septem-
ber, the ruling immediately affected 100,000 students planning to at-
tend summer school and many handicapped students in year-round 
programs.”83  Public pressure was applied and on July 8, 1976 the Leg-
islature passed, and Governor Byrne signed a two- to two-and-a-half 
percent income tax.84  There was great consternation.  Governor 
Byrne was soundly criticized.85  (This occurred just at the same time 
that New York was developing off-track betting called OTB.)  Byrne 
gained a nickname based on the off-track betting—OTB standing for 
“One Term” Byrne.86 
Added to the income tax was a provision for property tax relief.87  
Some of the money from the tax was set aside to give rebates to all 
homeowners in the state and rebates for renters.88  Interestingly, 
rather than give those rebates as a reduction in the income tax paid, 
they were given out to the citizens in mailed rebate checks.  The in-
come tax was taken out of paychecks.  The people became accus-
tomed to the small income tax (two- or two and a half percent at the 
beginning which in later years grew to six percent) compared to the 
federal income tax.  The rebate checks came directly from Governor 
Byrne’s office and seemed like a godsend.  Byrne was able to avoid 
the prophecy of his nickname and was elected to a second term.89  A 
number of factors helped Byrne.  Many people ran in the Democratic 
primary.  Byrne won with a small percentage, but no runoff is pro-
vided for in the primary.  His Republican opponent in the general 
election did not run a particularly good campaign.  Byrne won by a 
margin well below his previous election.90 
 
 83 SALMORE & SALMORE, supra note 1, at 197. 
 84 New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A:1-1 through 10-12 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2005).  The tax was two percent of the first $20,000 and two-and-
a-half percent of the amount in excess of $20,000.  Id. § 54A:2-1. 
 85 Felzenberg, supra note 11, at 451–52. 
 86 Herb Jackson, Torricelli in Race to Top of Hill, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), 
Sept. 9, 2002, at AO3 (“Gov. Brendan “One-Term” Byrne was so wounded by enact-
ing the state’s first income tax that challenger Raymond Bateman was ahead, 44 per-
cent to 39 percent, in a September Eagleton poll.  Just 33 percent said Byrne was do-
ing an excellent or good job, but two months later, Byrne won by 14 percentage 
points.”). 
 87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:9-25 (West 1999). 
 88 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:4-3  (repealed 1991). 
 89 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW JERSEY 110 (Maxine N. Lurie & Marc Mappen eds., 
2004). 
 90 In 1973 Byrne beat Charles Sandman, 1,397,613 votes to 676,235.  He defeated 
Raymond Bateman 1,184,564 votes to 888,880 in 1977.  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MANUAL 
OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 460 (1997). 
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Chief Justice Hughes had finally achieved his long-sought re-
sult—an income tax.  Bob Braun, who was for many years the educa-
tion editor for the Star-Ledger newspaper, criticized Hughes and the 
Supreme Court for trying to run the schools: 
 I remember sitting across from the late Richard J. Hughes when 
he was Supreme Court chief justice.  We were supposed to be talk-
ing about what Hughes did for colleges when he was governor, 
but he didn’t want to talk about that. 
 He wanted to talk about how the Legislature had refused to give 
him the state income tax he wanted back in the 1960s.  This was 
1976 and the Legislature was still refusing, only this time Brendan 
Byrne was governor. 
 “They didn’t want the income tax then?  Well, they’ll want one 
now.” 
 I didn’t know what he meant.  A few days later, he issued a rul-
ing closing the schools until legislators screamed from pain and 
passed the tax. 
 So it was more a public relations gimmick than a real threat.  So 
the schools already were closed for the summer.  Still, the idea 
that one guy—even so nice a guy as Dick Hughes—had that sort 
of unrestrained power gave pause.91 
Braun did not believe that the courts should have that much power.  
But the decisions by the Hughes Court would be considered re-
strained when compared with the next series of school funding cases 
under future Chief Justice Wilentz. 
In later years, the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with a whole 
new set of cases dealing with school funding entitled Abbott v. Burke I 
through XIV.92  In these cases the court went much further than the 
court in the Robinson cases.  As predicted by Hughes in his concurring 
opinion in Robinson V, the court determined in Abbott II93 that the 
statute deemed facially constitutional in Robinson V was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the poorest districts in the state.94  Those districts 
 
 91 Robert J. Braun, Judges are in the Wrong Court When it Comes to Setting Education 
Policy, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 19, 1997, at 21. 
 92 See generally Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s Ex-
perience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615 (2004); Paul 
L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Education Rights Under the New Jersey 
Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827 (1998). 
 93 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).  Abbott I had 
been a procedural case to decide whether the case should be handled in the Supe-
rior Court or through the administrative process.  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 
269, 495 A.2d 376 (1985). 
 94 The school districts that the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on were pri-
marily city schools like Newark, Trenton, Camden, Jersey City, etc.  However, other 
schools that were more rural actually argued that they were sufficiently bad to fit 
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became known as Abbott Districts and had to receive funding equal to 
or greater than the funding provided in the wealthiest districts in the 
state.95  One of the problems this created was that the wealthiest and 
the poorest districts received funding which in many cases was far 
greater than the funding in the middle districts.  This resulted in a 
number of school districts actually arguing that they were bad 
enough to be considered an Abbott District.  Eventually, the Abbott Dis-
tricts would receive up to eighty-five percent of their funding from 
the State while other districts receive the vast proportion of funding 
from local property taxes.96  In one action, a group of rural schools 
argued that they, too, should be given added support because they 
had problems similar to those in the inner-cities.97 
In later Abbott cases, the court went further and mandated par-
ticular programs and new school construction.  For example, the 
court required that all schools in the Abbott Districts provide full-day 
kindergarten programs and half-day pre-kindergarten programs for 
three- and four-year-olds.98  The mandate that the state provide new 
and rehabilitated schools within the poorest districts led to a massive 
bond issue of $8.6 billion, $6 billion of which was to be used for the 
schools in the thirty-two poorest districts in the state.99  The court fur-
 
within the ambit of the Abbott districts.  See Abby Goodnough, Rural Schools Feel Ig-
nored by Trenton Aid to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1997, at A1. 
 95 Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408. 
 96 New Jersey Department of Education, Comparative Spending Guide 2005: 
Summary of Vital Statistics: Operating Type ABBOTT, http://www.state.nj.us/ 
njded/guide/2005/abbott.pdf (Mar. 2005).  For example, in 2005, Newark, which is 
in Essex County, received eighty-four percent of its funding from the State of New 
Jersey, nine percent from local property taxes and six percent from the Federal Gov-
ernment.  Id.  On the other hand Glen Ridge, which is also in Essex County, received 
only five percent of its funding from New Jersey and ninety-one percent of its fund-
ing from local property taxes.  New Jersey Department of Education, Comparative 
Spending Guide 2005: Summary of Vital Statistics: Operating Type K–12, http:// 
www.state.nj.us/njded/guide/2005/k-12.pdf (Mar. 2005). 
 97 See generally John Dayton, Rural Children, Rural Schools, and Public School Funding 
Litigation: A Real Problem in Search of a Real Solution, 82 NEB. L. REV. 99 (2003). 
 98 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998).  The court man-
dated this even though the constitutional provision which justified the cases only 
provided that a through and efficient education had to be provided to those from 
ages five through eighteen.  Id. at 489, 710 A.2d at 454. 
 99 This was called the Educational Facilities Construction and Financing Act.  N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7G-1 through -30, -57 through -71 (West Supp. 2005).  It was chal-
lenged as unconstitutional in violation of the debt limitation provision of the New 
Jersey Constitution.  N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3.  That provision requires “no such 
law shall take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people at a general elec-
tion and approved by a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting 
thereon.”  Id.  The bond issue was not submitted to the voters.  However, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Lonegan v. State, 174 N.J. 435, 809 A.2d 91 (2002), upheld 
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ther held that all of the funding for the construction or rehabilitation 
of the schools in the Abbott Districts had to come from the State.  As it 
turned out, the $6 billion was insufficient to fund all the schools re-
quested in the Abbott Districts.100 
It is clear that there will be continuing litigation as the court 
continues to oversee the problem of school funding in New Jersey. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court was one of the first state courts 
to become so involved in the issue of school funding.101  Those cases 
have been cited hundreds of times by courts across the country.  
Some courts have adopted the approach of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court while others have rejected it.102  But New Jersey has taken dra-
matic steps to improve educational opportunities in the poorest areas 
in the state. 
The Robinson v. Cahill and Abbott v. Burke series of cases may be 
the most far-reaching cases decided by the Hughes Court.  However, 
the case that may have been the most gut-wrenching and difficult 
case the court faced during Hughes’ tenure was the right to die case 
of Karen Ann Quinlan. 
IN RE QUINLAN 
Karen Ann Quinlan was a young woman from New Jersey who, 
for undetermined reasons, went into a coma.103  She was in a coma for 
some time when it became clear that she was in a persistent vegetative 
 
the constitutionality of the bond issue in large measure because it was the result of 
the Abbott line of cases and its constitutional mandate to fulfill the requirements of 
the “thorough and efficient” education clause in the constitution.  Id. at 462, 809 
A.2d at 107. 
 100 “Virtually all of the SCC’s [Schools Construction Corp.] $6 billion funding for 
the poorer districts—as well as another $2.6 billion for suburban districts—has been 
depleted with less than one-third of the projects completed that districts say they 
need.”  John Mooney, Corzine: School Program ‘a Disgrace’ Candidate Would Ask Voters to 
Approve More Funding for Construction, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 9, 2005, at 
31. 
 101 “Some states have experienced protracted serial litigation that has extended 
for decades.”  Dayton & Dupre, supra note 55, at 2353–54, citing to the seven Robin-
son v. Cahill cases and the first two Abbott v. Burke cases. 
 102 John Dayton says “35 states highest courts have ruled on the merits of constitu-
tional challenges to their states’ funding systems, with 18 courts upholding states’ sys-
tems of public school funding, and 17 courts declaring school funding systems un-
constitutional.”  Dayton, supra note 43, at 447. 
 103 “On the night of April 15, 1975, for reasons still unclear, Karen Quinlan ceased 
breathing for at least two 15 minute periods.  She received some ineffectual mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation from friends.  She was taken by ambulance to Newton Memo-
rial Hospital.”  In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 647, 653–54 (1976). 
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state and unaware of what was happening.104  She was kept alive by a 
respirator as well as a feeding tube.  Her loving parents, who were de-
vout Catholics, agonized over what to do.  Finally they decided to 
have the respirator removed.  The doctors at the hospital refused 
their request.  They believed that she was not brain dead and there-
fore, it was not permissible to remove the respirator.105  This was to 
become one of the most famous cases in recent history.  The news 
media covered the case intensively.  The New York Daily News even 
took a poll of public opinion finding that fifty-nine percent agreed 
that Karen Ann should be permitted to die, twenty-four percent dis-
agreed and seventeen percent had no opinion.106 
One author described the Quinlans in the following way: 
 Joseph and Julia Quinlan were ordinary Americans who had ex-
traordinary virtues.  Thrust into the limelight, they displayed a 
modest courage and moral sincerity, which the media translated 
into almost saintly terms.  Although they had given up hope for 
their daughter’s recovery, they visited her at least once a day.  “I 
don’t believe I could go to bed without saying anything to her,” 
Julia Quinlan told readers of Time.  “Just like saying good night, 
you know, to your other children.”  At the same time, however, 
they were seeking to let her die—or rather, as Joseph put it, to 
place her in the hands of the Lord.  He was asking to be his 
daughter’s guardian in order to lose her.  That was the agonizing 
responsibility that modern medicine had imposed on him and on 
innumerable parents reading about him.107 
As medical technology developed, many individuals who would 
have died in earlier times were being kept alive by artificial means.  
Even before the Quinlan case a right to die movement had begun.  
“As medical technology increasingly prolonged life, patients and their 
families demanded the right to forgo or withdraw life-support . . . .”108  
However, the legislatures and the courts had not dealt with these is-
sues.  “[T]he event that reshaped the cultural landscape by giving ir-
revocable meanings and force to ‘the right to die’—occurred only in 
1975.  That was when Joseph and Julia Quinlan went to court in New 
 
 104 Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 655. 
 105 Id. at 24–25, 355 A.2d at 655. 
 106 PETER G. FILENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE RIGHT-
TO-DIE IN AMERICA 25 (1998).  This book details some of the early history of Karen 
and her family. 
 107 Id. at 76; see also generally JULIA DUANE QUINLAN, MY JOY, MY SORROW: KAREN 
ANN’S MOTHER REMEMBERS (2005). 
 108 FILENE, supra note 106, at xv. 
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Jersey, asking that their comatose daughter be taken off a respira-
tor.”109 
The distinguished group of lawyers that gathered in Judge 
Robert Muir’s courtroom in Morris County represented many differ-
ent interested parties: the Quinlans themselves, the doctors, the hos-
pital, the Morris County prosecutor, the Attorney General of the 
State, and the attorney for the guardian ad litem.  But it was a 
strongly contested case.  One of the lawyers went so far as to allude to 
Nazi Germany when people were exterminated if they were no longer 
useful.110  The State maintained the position that it would be murder 
to remove the respirator.  Paul Armstrong,111 representing the Quin-
lans, argued for their right to remove the respirator.  The trial court 
in New Jersey appointed a guardian.  After a trial and hearing, the 
court determined that the respirator should not be removed.112 
“Far from cooling the public controversy, Muir’s decision fanned 
it to new intensity.  Spokesmen for the American Medical Association 
and the American Bar Association applauded the judge for preserv-
ing physicians’ autonomy.”113 
The case then went directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
bypassing the Appellate Division.  New Jersey court rules permit the 
New Jersey Supreme Court to certify a case directly to itself.114  This is 
often done in cases of great importance where it is obvious that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court will have to review the case eventually.  
Mrs. Quinlan, who attended the hearing before the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, said that Chief Justice Hughes, as well as the other Jus-
tices, asked many questions but she could not get any impression as 
to the potential outcome.115  She was amazed when the decision was 
unanimous in favor of her and her husband.116 
Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.  
It was a grueling day when the court considered this case in confer-
ence with all the Justices finding the issues difficult and draining.  Ul-
timately they decided that the father should be the guardian and 
 
 109 Id. at 10. 
 110 Id. at 27–28. 
 111 Paul Armstrong would later become a Superior Court judge in New Jersey.  In-
terestingly, Chief Justice Hughes was so impressed by the work of Paul Armstrong 
that he would later write a letter in support of his judicial nomination.   
 112 In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). 
 113 FILENE, supra note 106, at 44. 
 114 SYLVIA B. PRESSLER, RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
R. 2:12-1 (2006). 
 115 Interview with Julia Quinlan (April 27, 2005). 
 116 Id. 
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have the power to decide in conjunction with the doctors and the 
ethics committee at the hospital whether or not to remove the respi-
rator.117  The Chief Justice has the power to assign the writing of opin-
ions.118  Chief Justice Hughes assigned himself this heart-wrenching 
opinion.  Interestingly, Hughes, who always wrote his own opinions, 
wrote this opinion in North Carolina where his wife Betty Hughes was 
at a medical clinic.  As Hughes said: “‘In February, I went to Durham, 
N.C., to visit Betty who was there for treatment for diabetes.  I was 
due to go from there to Japan where I had a commitment.  Betty said, 
“Tell the Japanese that they’ll have to wait.  That girl is dying.  Sit 
down this afternoon and get going.”  I wrote the opinion down 
there.’” 119 
The opinion details the findings of the doctors concerning the 
condition of Karen Ann.  “Dr. Morse and other expert physicians who 
examined her characterized Karen as being in a ‘chronic persistent 
vegetative state.’  Dr. Fred Plum, one of such expert witnesses, de-
fined this as a ‘subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the 
vegetative parts of neurological function but who * * * no longer has 
any cognitive function.’”120  Hughes further described her condition: 
“Karen is described as emaciated, having suffered a weight loss of at 
least 40 pounds, and undergoing a continuing deteriorative process.  
Her posture is described as fetal-like and grotesque; there is extreme 
flexion-rigidity of the arms, legs and related muscles and her joints 
are severely rigid and deformed.”121  The doctors also agreed that she 
was not brain dead under the then-existing definitions.122  The testi-
mony further indicated that removal of the respirator would result in 
her death; however, how long she would live after the removal of the 
respirator was not known.123 
 
 117 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671–72 (1976). 
 118 SYLVIA B. PRESSLER, RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
R. 2:13-1(a) (2006) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall preside over sessions and confer-
ences of the court and shall sign all orders relating to the administration of the judi-
cial system.”). 
 119 Regina Murray, Richard Hughes (II), TRENTONIAN (Trenton, N.J.), Nov. 23, 
1986, at 52. 
 120 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654 (alteration in original). 
 121 Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655. 
 122 Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. 
 123 The doctors had predicted that even with the respirator she would probably 
not live long.  As Hughes said, “no physician risked the opinion that she could live 
more than a year and indeed she may die much earlier.”  Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.  
He also said “removal from the respirator would cause her death soon, although the 
time cannot be stated with more precision.”  Id., 355 A.2d at 656.  In fact she lived for 
many years after the respirator was removed. 
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The court looked at a number of different legal theories,124 but 
turned to the right to privacy as the determining legal principle.  This 
right had been found in both the United States Constitution125 and 
the New Jersey Constitution.126  While the court recognized that the 
right to privacy was not without limitation, it determined that it did 
encompass the right of a person to refuse life-sustaining treatment.127  
The court said that: “Presumably this [privacy] right is broad enough 
to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under 
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy under certain 
conditions.”128  The court recognized the State’s interest in preserving 
life, but went on to say: 
We think that the State’s interest contra weakens and the individ-
ual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion in-
creases and the prognosis dims. . . . It is for that reason that we be-
lieve Karen’s choice, if she were competent to make it, would be 
vindicated by the law.  Her prognosis is extremely poor,—she will 
never resume cognitive life.  And the bodily invasion is very 
great,—she requires 24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, 
the assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube.129 
Normally, a competent person could form his or her own opin-
ion as to accepting or rejecting the respirator, but in this case Karen 
was unable to make that decision.  The court held that the father, as 
guardian, in conjunction with the doctors and the ethics board of the 
hospital could make that decision.130  In the conclusion of the opin-
ion, Chief Justice Hughes summed up his opinion: 
 We repeat for the sake of emphasis and clarity that upon the 
concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the re-
sponsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reason-
able possibility of Karen’s ever emerging from her present coma-
tose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-
support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be 
discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital “Ethics Commit-
tee” or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospital-
 
 124 Id. at 35–39, 355 A.2d at 661–63 (discussing free exercise of religion and cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
 125 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (recognizing a “‘right to pri-
vacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the 
people.’”). 
 126 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 127 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39–40, 355 A.2d.at 663. 
 128 Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. 
 129 Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. 
 130 Id., 355 A.2d at 664. 
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ized.  If that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable 
possibility of Karen’s ever emerging from her present comatose 
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support sys-
tem may be withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or 
criminal liability therefor on the part of any participant, whether 
guardian, physician, hospital or others.131 
Chief Justice Hughes did not directly reverse Judge Muir.132  
Chief Justice Hughes believed that under the state of the law at the 
time, the trial court’s opinion was correct.  It was necessary for the 
highest court of the State to make this ground-breaking decision. 
One of the striking things about the decision is the long descrip-
tion given of the Roman Catholic position on the issue.133  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the Catholic Church would 
not prohibit the removal of the respirator.  Hughes said: “the ‘Catho-
lic view’ of religious neutrality in the circumstances of this case is 
considered by the Court only in the aspect of its impact upon the 
conscience, motivation and purpose of the intending guardian, Jo-
seph Quinlan, and not as a precedent in terms of the civil law.”134  It is 
true that Joseph Quinlan was a Catholic and had looked into the 
Catholic position before he decided to request the removal of the 
feeding tube.135  He would not have made that decision if he learned 
that the Catholic Church would prohibit the removal.  However, such 
a recitation of the Catholic Church’s position was not necessary to de-
termine the propriety of the choice of Joseph Quinlan as guardian 
for his daughter.  It appeared that Hughes wanted to assure himself 
of the morality of the decision he was making.  As a devout Catholic, 
the Church’s position on this matter would assure him of the morality 
of the decision. 
The announcement of the court’s decision was first page news in 
all the newspapers in this country and even around the world.  
“Opening the CBS Evening News, Walter Cronkite announced in 
somber tones: ‘The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled today on an 
issue that has tormented the consciences of the legal and medical 
professions.’”136 
 
 131 Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671–72. 
 132 Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664. 
 133 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 33–34, 355 A.2d at 660. 
 134 Id. at 33, 355 A.2d at 660. 
 135 Id. at 30, 355 A.2d at 657. 
 136 FILENE, supra note 106, at 93. 
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After the opinion was issued, the respirator was removed.137  De-
spite the opinions of the doctors, Karen did not die as a result of the 
removal.  She lived for more than nine years.  In part, her survival re-
sulted from her slow weaning from the respirator.  “The doctors and 
staff were working to ‘wean’ Karen.  Every few days they detached the 
respirator and stood by, ready to reinsert it the moment she seemed 
in danger of expiring.  At first she was able to breathe on her own for 
an hour, then two hours, then longer.”138  Eventually she was success-
fully weaned and lived for many years in the continuing vegetative 
state.  The parents never returned to court to request the removal of 
the feeding tube.  Instead, they created a hospice program in honor 
of their daughter.139 
Today, the decision of the court is probably seen as a given, but 
at the time it was a momentous and controversial decision.  Since 
then, many courts have reached similar results.140  Even the United 
States Supreme Court has discussed the issue in the Cruzan case.141  In 
that case, the Court referred to Quinlan as the “seminal” case in the 
right to die area and assumed the existence of a constitutional right 
to refuse medical treatment.142  Many states have now adopted statutes 
permitting people to make living wills setting forth their desires in fu-
ture situations if they are unable to make medical decisions.143  (Un-
fortunately, the court battles over these issues have not ended be-
cause so many people do not create living wills.) 
In more recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has moved 
away from reliance on the right to privacy and toward reliance on the 
 
 137 Id. at 125–31. 
 138 Id. at 125. 
 139 Interview with Julia Quinlan (April 27, 2005). 
 140 Rob McStay, Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucks-
berg and Quill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 47 n.17 (2003). 
 141 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  The majority opin-
ion in Cruzan left open the question of whether the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes a right to refuse 
lifesaving medical treatment.  Id. at 279 & n.7.  Chief Justice Rehnquist only assumed 
that such a right existed for the purpose of deciding the case.  Id. at 279.  The opin-
ions of the four dissenting Justices, and the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor, 
indicate that at least five Justices, on the date the Cruzan opinion was decided, be-
lieved that there was a right of a mentally competent adult to refuse lifesaving medi-
cal treatment or lifesaving nutrition.  However, there was no majority opinion or rul-
ing regarding the issue of whether there is a ‘right to die.’  JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 982 (7th ed. 2004). 
 142 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270, 300–01. 
 143 Carole Ann Mooney, Deciding Not to Resuscitate Hospital Patients: Medical and Le-
gal Perspectives, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1053 n.165. 
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common law right to refuse medical treatment.144  Despite that, the 
Quinlan case stands as the beginning point in the evolution of legal 
thinking on the right to die. 
In more recent years, the case of Theresa Marie Schiavo145 
gained notoriety similar to that of the Quinlan case.  That case dealt 
with a situation in which the parents and husband of a woman in a 
coma disagreed as to whether she should be permitted to die.  The 
differences between the two situations were great.  First and perhaps 
most importantly, the family in the Quinlan case was united in their 
determination to request the removal of the respirator.146  Secondly, 
the Quinlans never requested removal of the feeding tube, which was 
at issue in the Schiavo case.  In the Schiavo case the parents and the 
husband were in disagreement whether she would have wanted the 
feeding tube removed.  The courts in Florida used a “clear and con-
vincing” standard to determine that Mrs. Schiavo would have wanted 
the feeding tube removed.147  The parents objected to that outcome 
and went to great lengths to prevent the removal.  Ultimately the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order that the feed-
ing tube be removed148 and Mrs. Schiavo died.149 
While the issues in the Quinlan case and the Schiavo case were 
different, it is clear that the law that has developed in New Jersey 
since the Quinlan opinion would have permitted the removal of the 
feeding tube if it was determined that the person who was incompe-
tent to make the decision would have wanted the removal.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court authorized the removal of both nutrition and 
hydration in In re Conroy.150  The court carefully restricted the situa-
tions in which this would be allowed, but made it clear that, if it could 
be determined in someway that this would have been the wish of the 
 
 144 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
 145 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005).  It 
must be noted that there were dozens of decisions made in this case over the course 
of ten years.  The case cited above was the last substantive decision handed down be-
fore Terri Schiavo passed away. 
 146 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 28, 355 A.2d 647, 656 (1976). 
 147 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101 (West 2002). 
 148 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (holding unconstitutional “Terri’s 
Law,” a law passed by the Florida Legislature allowing Florida Governor Jeb Bush to 
intervene in the case). 
 149 Abby Goodnough, Schiavo Dies, Ending Bitter Case Over Feeding Tube, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 150 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
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incompetent, it would be permitted.151  However, that case as well as 
In re Peter152 dealt with elderly nursing home patients who had a lim-
ited life expectancy even with the artificial support.  In In re Nancy 
Ellen Jobes,153 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with a woman who 
was only thirty-one years old.  The trial court permitted the removal 
of the life-sustaining food nutrition system upon request of the hus-
band who was joined in making this request by the parents of his 
wife.154  As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted: “After a seven-day 
trial, the court found that Mr. Jobes had proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that his wife is in a persistent vegetative state with no 
prospect of improvement, and that, if competent, she would not want 
to be sustained by the j-tube under her present circumstances.”155  
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this decision.  Thus, the 
New Jersey courts have moved beyond the decision of Chief Justice 
Hughes in Quinlan to further permit the right to die in those situa-
tions where the court believes that this is what the patient would have 
wanted. 
Mrs. Quinlan indicated that she had never met Chief Justice 
Hughes before the case, although she and her husband always had a 
good opinion of Governor Hughes.156  They respected him as a good 
and caring former Governor.  But after the case was over, Hughes be-
came friendly with the Quinlans and included them in many family 
events.  Mrs. Quinlan recalled that he was a gracious and charming 
host.  She considered it a privilege to be his friend.  The Quinlans 
even sat with the family during the funeral of the Governor.157 
 
 151 The court used three different tests.  First, the court used a subjective test 
when the actual wishes of the incompetent could be determined by the evidence.  Id. 
at 360–61, 486 A.2d at 1229.  It also adopted two objective tests.  The first is a limited-
objective test when there is some evidence of the incompetent’s wishes and the pain 
the incompetent is suffering outweighs the benefits of continued life.  Id. at 361–62, 
486 A.2d at 1230.  The other objective test is the pure-objective test, which applies 
when there is no evidence of the incompetent’s wishes.  Id. at 365–66, 486 A.2d at 
1231–32.  It should be noted that Justice Handler in a dissenting opinion was dissatis-
fied with the test because he felt that it focused too narrowly on the issue of pain and 
failed to take into consideration other issues of human decency and independence.  
Id. at 394–96, 486 A.2d at 1247–48 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 152 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). 
 153 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
 154 In re Nancy Ellen Jobes, 210 N.J. Super. 543, 510 A.2d 133 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1986). 
 155 108 N.J. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437.  The j-tube had been inserted through a hole 
cut into her abdominal cavity. 
 156 Interview with Julia Quinlan, mother of Karen Ann Quinlan, in Sparta, N.J. 
(April 27, 2005). 
 157 Id. 
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HUGHES AS JUDICIAL CRAFTSMAN 
Some justices and judges have their law clerks draft their opin-
ions.  Hughes did not.  He wrote all his own opinions.  A former clerk 
to Chief Justice Hughes stated that: 
 When it came to opinion writing, Chief Justice Hughes did eve-
rything himself.  In his chambers, there was a shelf over his desk, 
and his clerks would pull all the relevant volumes for him so he 
could use the cases when he needed them.  This was no small task 
for him, because his eyesight was not the best.  Only when he had 
completed his draft opinion would he share it with us for our in-
put and comments.  Generally that was minimal, because he had 
hit the target head-on.158 
Another of his clerks wrote: “He drafted all of his own opinions.  Our 
job was to then edit, beef up, find and check citations and test the 
bench memo that was written by other clerks to make sure that the 
law was correct. . . . But, he was the author from the ‘get go.’”159  An-
other clerk, while confirming that Hughes wrote all his own opinions, 
indicated that the Chief Justice gave him more of a role in helping to 
develop the State of the Judiciary speech Hughes gave to the Legisla-
ture.160  He said that Hughes was particularly pleased with certain of 
the expressions he used in that speech.161  In all Hughes wrote twenty-
seven majority opinions, five concurring opinions and twelve dissent-
ing opinions.  Of course, he joined in many other opinions.  He may 
have written other opinions as well because the Court sometimes is-
sues per curiam opinions, which are not signed.  This is particularly 
true in cases dealing with lawyer discipline.  Justice Pashman in a 
tribute to Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
 Richard Hughes did not merely supervise the workings of our 
court during this period; as Chief Justice, he felt it his duty to also 
personally pen many of the seminal decisions handed down dur-
ing his tenure.  His ability to grasp complexities in diverse fields 
of law is no better illustrated than by an enumeration of some of 
the varied areas in which he wrote: tort law, criminal procedure, 
rate-making, insurance law, secured transactions, education, civil 
service, and professional responsibility.162 
 
 158 Letter from Gary A. Ehrlich, supra note 25. 
 159 Letter from John M. Donnelly, former law clerk to Chief Justice Hughes, to au-
thor (April 13, 2005) (on file with author). 
 160 Interview with Hon. Ronald J. Hedges, United States Magistrate Judge, United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey; former law clerk to Chief Justice 
Hughes, in Newark, N.J. (Jan. 24, 2005). 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Pashman, supra note 18, at 88 (footnotes omitted). 
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ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURT HUGHES 
As noted, the position of Chief Justice in New Jersey is not purely 
judicial.  It is also administrative.  In his administrative role, Hughes 
initiated a system of judicial evaluation—the first in the country.  He 
also appointed non-lawyers to the disciplinary committees dealing 
with improprieties of attorneys.  He worked to reduce sentencing 
disparities within the counties and between the counties.  He an-
nounced the first pre-trial intervention program in the country in an 
effort to keep young offenders and first-time offenders out of the 
criminal process.  He even took a large group of judges on a tour of 
Rahway State Prison so that they would understand the consequences 
of their sentencing decisions. 
Chief Justice Hughes gave a State of the Judiciary address to the 
Legislature in 1977.  In that address he said: “So far as I can deter-
mine, this is the first time our branches of government have come to-
gether in the chambers of the Legislature to consider together the 
public interest in the administration of justice.”163  It would also be 
the last time such an event occurred. 
In that address, he urged the Legislature to put a constitutional 
amendment on the ballot which would permit the County Courts to 
be merged into the Superior Courts in order to have a fully inte-
grated judicial system.  That Amendment was eventually placed on 
the ballot and passed. 
Another reason for Hughes’ appearance before the Legislature 
was his concern over judicial attrition.  Under the New Jersey system, 
the Legislature determines the salaries of the judges.  There are no 
automatic cost of living raises or any ability on the part of the judicial 
system to increase the salaries of the judges.  At the time of the ad-
dress by Governor Hughes, there had been no pay raise for many 
years.  Hughes was well aware of the difficulty of living on a judicial 
salary since he had resigned from the judiciary many years earlier be-
cause the salary was not sufficient for him to raise his children.  After 
discussing at length all the new initiatives and programs the judiciary 
had developed, Hughes said: 
 The subject I am about to discuss, however, is so serious and ur-
gent that a failure to act in this session of the Legislature could 
foreshadow, indeed almost invite, a beginning deterioration in 
the New Jersey court system.  I do not want to see this happen—I 
do not believe either you or the people want it to happen.  But 
 
 163 Richard J. Hughes, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, State of 
the Judiciary Address to the Legislature 1 (Nov. 21, 1977) (transcript on file with au-
thor). 
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ominous signs of change are apparent, none of which are in the 
interest of the State.  Several of our finest and most experienced 
judges have been forced to resign to adequately support their 
families.  The greatest difficulty has been encountered by the 
Governor in persuading able and experienced lawyers with chil-
dren in college, for instance, to accept appointment to the 
bench.164 
As previously noted, Hughes had resigned from the state court 
many years earlier because of the low salaries.  He did not want to see 
the courts lose their best judges.  To this day, judges do not generally 
earn as much as the top lawyers in the same communities. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief review of the work of Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes 
demonstrates his importance in developing the reputation of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court as an innovative activist court.  It also 
demonstrates his commitment to liberal principles.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court continues to take on difficult and controversial issues 
continuing the legacy of Hughes and the other outstanding Chief 
Justices who led the court since the new Constitution of New Jersey 
was written in 1947. 
 
 
 164 Id. at 33–34. 
